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CIVIL PROCEDURE - LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
Mouzavires v. Baxter, No. 11696 (D.C. Dec. 21, 1979),
rehearing en banc granted, No. 11696 (D.C. Feb. 4, 1980).
A recent case in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reflects the
trend toward liberal application of long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. William E. Mouzavires, a District of Columbia patent and
trademark attorney, was called by a member of a North Miami Beach,
Florida law firm and asked to assist in representing one of the firm's clients
in a trademark infringement claim before the federal district court in Flor-
ida.' After agreeing to work with the firm on the Florida case, Mouzavires
did considerable work at his District of Columbia office and also at the
United States Patent Office in Virginia.2 When a dispute arose as to his
fee, Mouzavires filed suit in the Superior Court for the District of Colum-
bia alleging jurisdiction over the Florida defendants pursuant to the Dis-
trict of Columbia "long-arm statute."3  Defendants were served by
certified mail at their offices in Florida and promptly moved to quash serv-
ice and dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court
granted the motion to quash service,4 and Mouzavires appealed. A three-
judge panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded with instructions to deny the motion to quash service.5 The
majority held that if a nonresident law firm hires a District of Columbia
attorney to assist it in an out-of-state case with reason to believe that much
of the work will be performed in the attorney's office in the District of
1. The Florida law firm of Baxter, Friedman, Robbins & Fisher first contacted appel-
lant Mouzavires in May, 1974. As a result of this telephone call, Mouzavires agreed to work
on the case at his District of Columbia office, and to some extent, at the United States Patent
Office facilities in Virginia. Later correspondence between the firm and Mouzavires con-
firmed the agreement. Mouzavires v. Baxter, No. 11696, slip op. at 2-3 & n.2 (D.C. Dec. 21,
1979).
2. The law firm maintained contact with Mr. Mouzavires through telephone and mail
communication although they never traveled to the District of Columbia. After accepting a
partial retainer, Mouzavires' services included the preparation of interrogatories and legal
memoranda as well as other services. Id
3. D.C. CODE § 13-423 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's -
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia.
4. Mouzavires v. Baxter, No. 5982-76 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 1977).
5. Mouzavires v. Baxter, No. 11696 (D.C. Dec. 21, 1979) rehearing en banc granted,
No. 11696 (D.C. Feb. 4, 1980).
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Columbia, the nonresident is "transacting. . . business" within the forum
and is therefore properly subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts.
6
The court emphasized that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
appellees would not offend due process since the appellees' contacts with
the forum were deliberate and voluntary, indicating a substantial connec-
tion with the District of Columbia.7 According to the standard applied in
Mouzavires, jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper when "the
defendant's contacts with the forum are of such a quality and nature that
they manifest a deliberate and voluntary association with the forum"8 and
that "the possible need to invoke the benefits and protections of the fo-
rum's laws was reasonably foreseeable. . . ."' The court's standard de-
6. No. 11696, slip op. at 16. The court cited several cases in which personal jurisdic-
tion was sustained over nonresident defendants who never entered the jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Cook Assocs. v. Colonial Broach & Machine Co., 14 I11. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27
(1973) (telephone contacts with the jurisdiction only); Cohn-Daniel Corp. v. Corporacion
De la Fonda, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (contact by mail). The court also
noted that due process will allow the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant even when the initial solicitation to enter into a contract was made by the plain-
tiff, as long as the defendant's contacts with the forum were otherwise sufficient and volun-
tary. No. 11696, slip op. at 14-15. See Vencedor Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gougler Indus., 557 F.2d
886 (Ist Cir. 1977); Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962).
7. No. 11696, slip op. at 16-17. The most important and, perhaps, still unsettled aspect
of long-arm jurisdiction in the District of Columbia is the extent to which the "transacting
any business" standard can be considered to extend to the maximum limits permissible
under due process. The majority in Mouzavires unequivocally stated that "§ 13-423 is coex-
tensive with the due process clause." Id at 8. Judge Harris, in his dissent in Mouzavires,
urged that the long-arm statute is not coextensive with the due process clause so that its
exercise would never violate due process. Rather, Judge Harris maintained that the long-
arm statute should be applied in a two-step procedure. First, there would be a determina-
tion whether the defendant has "transact[ed] any business" in the District of Columbia.
Then, the court must decide whether service on the defendant would comport with due
process. No. 11696, slip op. at 22-23 (citing Haynes v. James H. Carr, Inc., 427 F.2d 700, 703
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970)). See also Rose v. Silver, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C.
1979) (Harris, J., dissenting).
8. No. 11696, slip op. at 15.
9. Id, quoting Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
As a guideline for determining the sufficiency of a nonresident's contacts with the forum,
"foreseeability" is rather amorphous. The Supreme Court recently considered long-arm
jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980), and also
found foreseeability to be an important component to due process in long-arm jurisdiction.
The Court said that in order to satisfy due process, "the defendant's conduct and connection
with the forum state [should be] such that he . . . reasonably anticipate[s] being haled into
court there." Id at 567. Woodson characterized the due process clause as giving "a degree
of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit." Id The Woodson view of foreseeability is clearly more protec-
tive of the nonresident than the Mouzavires standard that allows the exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction over a nonresident based on a transaction "which they foresaw would have con-
sequences here." Slip op. at 17.
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rives principally from the legislative history of the District of Columbia
long-arm statute which suggests that the "transacting any business" provi-
sion be "given an expansive interpretation."'" Furthermore, in
Mouzavires the court concluded that the "transacting any business" basis
for long-arm jurisdiction is coextensive with the due process clause.," Fi-
nally, the court of appeals, relying on the Supreme Court opinions McGee
v. International Life Insurance Co. 12 and Hanson v. Denckla,13 held that
long-arm jurisdiction satisfies due process considerations when the nonres-
ident defendant has a sufficient number of voluntary and deliberate con-
tacts with the forum.'
4
Thus, with an expansive view toward the application of long-arm juris-
diction, the court in Mouzavires found that a nonresident defendant is
"transacting . . .business" within the scope of section 13-423(a)(1) when
its contractual activities "cause a consequence" in the forum.' 5 This con-
clusion, however, is in sharp conflict with the court of appeals' earlier en
banc decision in Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood
Greene Engineers, Inc. 16
10. No. 11696, slip op. at 8. The court referred to the legislative history of § 13-423,
which indicates that Congress intended the District of Columbia to have a long-arm statute
essentially the same as those in Maryland and Virginia. See H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 61 (1970); S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1969). The Virginia and Mary-
land statutes have been interpreted as extending personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants to the fullest permissible limits of due process. See Groom v. Margulies, 257 Md.
691, 265 A.2d 249 (1970); Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 180 S.E.2d 664
(1971).
I1. No. 11696, slip op. at 8. In support, the court quoted from Textile Museum v. F.
Eberstadt & Co., 440 F. Supp. 30,31 (D.D.C. 1977), in which the same provision of the D.C.
long-arm statute was at issue:
This controversy presents both a statutory and a constitutional question. This
Court must determine whether there exists a constitutional power to subject de-
fendant to the jurisdiction of this Court, and also whether statutory provision has
been made for exercise of that power. Our inquiry need not be bifurcated, how-
ever, since the constitutional and statutory provisions are coextensive in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
No. 11696, slip op. at 8 n.5.
12. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
13. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
14. No. 11696, slip op. at 13-14. In his majority opinion in Environmental Research
Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976), Judge Harris argued
that no simple standard for minimum contacts can be drawn from either Hanson or McGee.
"Rather," he noted, "the jurisdictional issue must be resolved on a case-by-case basis noting
in each the particular activities relied upon by the resident plaintiff as providing the sup-
posed basis for jurisdiction." Id at 811.
15. No. 11696, slip op. at 9, citing Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978); Cohane v.
Arpeja-California, Inc., 385 A.2d 153 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
16. 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
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In Lockwood Greene, appellant Environmental Research, a consulting
firm incorporated in the District of Columbia, contacted Lockwood
Greene in South Carolina and agreed to assist in the latter's negotiations
with a Pennsylvania textile manufacturer. Toward this end, Environmen-
tal Research assisted in the preparation and processing of a grant applica-
tion through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). When a
contractual dispute arose between the parties, Environmental Research
sued Lockwood Greene in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
The complaint, however, was dismissed by the trial judge for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. While acknowledging a "trend towards liberalization of
jurisdictional limitations,"' 7 the court of appeals nonetheless held that
Lockwood Greene lacked sufficient contacts with the forum to satisfy the
requirements of due process.'" The court noted that Lockwood Greene
had never solicited work in the District of Columbia and its only affilia-
tions with the forum included two visits to EPA and various mail and tele-
phone contacts with appellant.' 9 In addition, the court stated that
Environmental Research was an independent contractor which had delib-
erately and voluntarily solicited business with a nonresident corporation.2"
Therefore, the court concluded, appellant's activities in the District of Co-
lumbia on behalf of appellees would not in themselves constitute sufficient
minimum contacts with the jurisdiction by the appellees.2
In contrast, the Mouzavires court emphasized that the voluntary and de-
liberate nature of appellee's action to engage Mouzavires' assistance in the
District of Columbia was sufficient to qualify as "transacting . . . busi-
ness" under section 13-423(a)(1). 22 Thus, this finding conflicts with the
court's earlier conclusion in Lockwood Greene: "The mere fact that a non-
resident has retained the professional services of a District of Columbia
17. Id at 811. The court further noted the language in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at
251, that "it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restric-
tions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts." 355 A.2d at 811.
18. 355 A.2d at 812. The majority in Lockwood Greene relied on the reasoning of Han-
son v. Denckla, that a defendant must act affirmatively to avail itself of the privileges, bene-
fits and protections of the laws of the forum. 355 A.2d at 812.
19. Appellee's visits to EPA in the District of Columbia were not considered transacting
business there because of the "government contacts" doctrine - the traditional judicial view
that entry into the District of Columbia solely for the purpose of dealing with the federal
government will not subject the nonresident defendant to the general jurisdiction of the
District of Columbia courts. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142
(D.C. Cir. 1945). But see 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 930 (1979) (recent District of Columbia cases
have substantially diminished the viability of the government contacts principle).
20. 355 A.2d at 812 n.7.
21. Id at 812.
22. No. 11696, slip op. at 17.
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firm, thereby setting into motion the resident party's own activities within
this jurisdiction, does not constitute an invocation by the nonresident of
the benefits and protections of the District's laws."2 3
The conflict between these two opinions could be resolved, however, if
key importance is placed upon the fact that in Mouzavires the nonresident
appellee initiated the activity within the District of Columbia by contact-
ing Mouzavires in the District and soliciting his assistance, while in Lock-
wood Greene Environmental Research went out of the jurisdiction and
solicited the business of the nonresident defendant. Yet, this distinction
was rejected in a strongly worded dissent to Mouzavires. In his dissent,
Judge Harris, author of the Lockwood Greene opinion, argued that the
Florida appellees had not deliberately invoked the benefits and protection
of the District's laws since the firm's only connection with the forum was
its contact with an attorney who happened to perform some of the work at
his office in the District of Columbia. According to Judge Harris, on the
basis of this factor alone, it cannot be said that the nonresident firm trans-
acted business within the meaning of section 13-423(a)(1). 24 Therefore,
following the "binding authority" of Lockwood Greene, Judge Harris ar-
gued that "a resident professional may not bring suit here against a non-
resident client based upon work which has been done by the resident
professional in the District of Columbia. 25
Mouzavires, therefore, leaves the law in the District of Columbia regard-
ing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants far from settled.
With somewhat similar factual situations, the Mouzavires court applied a
much more liberal interpretation of what contacts will constitute "transact-
ing. . . business" in the District of Columbia than did the court in Lock-
wood Greene. Indeed, the two cases presently are irreconcilable.
Perhaps to remedy this apparent conflict, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals has granted a rehearing en banc. On rehearing, the court may
choose to address whether application of the long-arm statute requires
both an initial determination that the nonresident defendant has trans-
acted business in the jurisdiction as well as a separate determination that
due process will permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. On the other hand, the court may seize the opportunity to affirm
Mouzavires and embrace a standard liberally construing what constitutes
"transacting . . .business."
23. 355 A.2d at 812.
24. No. 11696, slip op. at 24-25 (Harris, J., dissenting).
25. Id at 30. Judge Harris argued that since Lockwood Greene is an en banc opinion, it
is binding and may not be overturned by one division of the court. Id at 20.
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Affirmance of Mouzavires on rehearing seems unlikely, however, in light
of the recent Supreme Court decision, Rush v. Savchuk.26 In Rush, a state
court's exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant by attaching
his insurer's obligation to defend him in auto accident-related suits was
held to violate due process. The Court emphasized that the defendant's
contacts with the forum are still the primary concern in any just exercise of
jurisdiction.27 While Rush's insurer did business in the forum state, Rush
himself had no other contacts with the forum which would allow the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over him.28 The Rush decision makes clear that the
defendant's, not the plaintiffs, contacts with the forum will be decisive in
determining whether due process will allow the exercise of jurisdiction.
In Mouzavires, it appears that the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals relied too heavily on the plaintiffs connection with the forum in up-
holding the exercise of jurisdiction. In light of the Supreme Court's recent
indication that it will no longer condone an expansive application of long-
arm jurisdiction29, the court of appeals may reach a different conclusion in
Mouzavires after rehearing.
26. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
27. Id at 577.
28. Id
29. Id at 579.
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